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ARTICLES
THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED
NATIONS
CHARLES M. LICHENSTEIN*
Among the stresses and strains attendant on representing
the United States at the United Nations, none is more persis-
tent than sitting for hours on end at the UN Security Council
and listening to the venomous rhetoric and vituperation that
is routinely heaped there on the United States and on the
democratic West generally-and that passes in that "august
body" for rational debate. The issues that come before the
Security Council often are serious indeed. The proceedings,
rarely so-insofar as "serious" is to be equated with ger-
mane, based on fact, and to a substantial degree
dispassionate.
The more productively to while away some of those end-
less hours, I sometimes propounded tough questions for my-
self, questions closely related to the nature and quality of the
proceedings. (Some of my colleagues on the Council pre-
ferred to read newspapers or official cables, or to sign corre-
spondence, or even to snooze-all of which forms of time-
passing I rejected as undignified, unbefitting the representa-
tive of a great power, or quite simply as too ostentatious a
display of contempt, however well-deserved, for the Security
Council and for the United Nations system as a whole.) So, as
an alternative way of keeping my wits about me, I chose to
propound puzzlers, two in particular. One question was, do
the Soviets believe a word that I, or any of the other U.S.
representatives, might be saying? And the second question,
even more intriguing to me: do they believe a word that they
are saying?
These are more serious questions than you might at first
suppose. The answers to them should shed some light on the
character of the UN generally, and on the quality of the busi-
ness that is done there these days-as well as the dangers that
doing any business at all in such a forum may create for the
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U.S. and the West.
I tend to think that, yes, the Soviets do more or less be-
lieve what they hear us saying. Not believe, to be sure, in the
sense of acceptance or of willingness to enter into a genuine
debate about the issues that might be involved, and certainly
not believe in the sense of setting the groundrules for ger-
maneness to these issues. But they listen. They listen care-
fully, and the more so as they began to understand during
the three years I spent at the UN with Ambassador Kirkpat-
rick that the U.S. foreign policy and not simply playing word
games. They listen. And they receive important information,
important messages both about the principles basic to U.S.
foreign policy and the implementation of that principled for-
eign policy to specific situations. That certainly seemed to me
to be the case throughout the summer and early fall of 1982
when, to an unusual degree, U.S. policy concerning the war
in Lebannon was being articulated in the course of virtually
nonstop Security Council deliberations, most of them held in
camera in what at the UN are called "informal consulta-
tions"-deliberations in which only the 15 Council members
are present (along with key Secretariat staff), closed to non-
members, closed to the public and the press. THe U.S. did
not approve of Israel's action in Lebanon. But neither did we
intend, as the situation on the ground evolved, to let the So-
viets or the Syrians or the PLO use that disapproval as a
wedge to split the U.S. and Israel from their common pursuit
of a comprehensive peace settlement in the middle East, or
from their common desire to assist in the recreation of an
independent and autonomous Lebanon-and certainly we
did not intend to let the PLO snatch victory from the jaws of
a devastating defeat. To this extent, we used the Security
Council. We used it to define and to refine U.S. policy in the
Middle East-and, yes, the Soviets listened and believed and
got the message.
On the second question, I think the answer is "some-
times": yes, the Soviets believe what they are saying and, no,
they do not-but the important point is that, either way, it
doesn't make a whole lot of difference. The objective for
them, in the UN as in all public forums, is not "addressing
reality" or "hewing to the facts" or "seeking viable solutions
to situations of conflict" in ways that would make sense to us
in the West. They say and do what, in the judgment of their
government, has to be said and done in order to make effec-
tive use of the opportunities provided for them by the UN
Security Council, among all the forums available to them.
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Certainly nothing that I observe in the three years that I did
business with the Soviets in the Security Council suggested to
me that they had any interest in fulfilling the purposes of the
United Nations as enunciated in the Charter, or in engaging
in serious debate on issues of substance, or even-except in
the grossest sense-in articulating the objectives of the for-
eign policy.
When in September of 1983, for example, Korean Air
Line's flight 7 was shot down, the Soviet representatives in
the Security Council at first even denied that the incident had
occurred, (or that they knew that some airliner had suffered
an untimely fate). Only later on, when not even they could
deny the evidence of audiotapes of the voices of Soviet pilots
engaged in firing rockets at the straying civilian aircraft, did
they fall back on the defense of "protecting sovereign Soviet
territory" from a U.S.-directed "spy" mission. Facts and doc-
umentary evidence notwithstanding, the Soviet representa-
tives in the Security Council simply receive the official "line",
repeat it with little embellishment, and stick to it. In the an-
nual General Assembly debate on Afghanistan, the Soviets
pay not the slightest heed to massive documentation and eye-
witness accounts of vicious depredations committed by Soviet
occupation forces against civilian targets and the basic na-
tional infrastructure: they stick, rather, to the official "line"
that the Soviets are merely resisting foreign aggression (U.S.-
sponsored, U.S.-supported), arm-in-arm with the Afghan
people.
We, the U.S. and the West, are faced with a most curious
irony in the various councils of the United Nations-our cre-
ation, after all, and one in which we invested the highest
hopes and idealism and genuineness of purpose back in 1945.
I think it is ironic indeed that this forum, which was to re-
present the collective conscience of peace-loving people
throughout the world, has become an arena in which the So-
viet Union is uniquely capable of projecting its strengths and
influence, and one in which by contrast the vulnerabilities of
the U.S. and the democratic West are peculiarly exposed.
Consider various characteristics of UN proceedings from
this perspective of Soviet advantage and Western disadvan-
tage. Hardly anyone, it seems to me, takes the UN Charter
quite seriously any more. After all, the Charter requires the
member nations to abjure the use of force to resolve con-
flicts; yet, in the years since 1945, the world has been witness
to some one hundred twenty-five death-dealing conflicts, and
we are still counting. The Charter also forbids aggression, it
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insists on respect for the sovereign autonomy of all nations, it
calls for the protection and enhancement of human rights,
for the enjoyment of human freedom, and for the spread of
human welfare and of a better material way of life for all
people, everywhere in the world. Worthy objectives, every
one of them: I raise no question about that. The question I
do raise, however, is this: to what demonstrable extent has
the United Nations, as an organization, as a collective of its
members, contributed in the last forty years to the fulfillment
of any or all of these great goals? The record, it seems to me,
is not favorable.
To repeat, I do not believe that most UN members, most
of the time, take the Charter all that seriously any more. It is
true of the United States as well- in the sense of any real
expectation that the principles of the Charter will govern the
behavior of most of the members or control the outcomes of
the UN process. All the less so, indeed, when we consider the
particular issues and debates that dominate the UN agenda.
How can anyone take quite seriously the Charter's prohibi-
tion of armed aggression when, in the face of a clear and un-
provoked Libyan invasion of its neighbor Chad, in the sum-
mer of 1983, the Security Council is unable even to table a
resolution of moderate disapproval-and spends half its time
debating the parallel Libyan charge that the U.S., joined by
France and Zaire, are the guilty ones, owing to their response
to Chad's call for help?
What is even more peculiar, however, is that the Soviets
and their clients and surrogates (like Libya, for example) are
not even expected to live up to the principles enunciated in
the Charter. I cannot count the times I was chided by my
colleagues with such questions as, "Why do you Americans
keep arguing with the Soviets? Why do you keep making
these harsh statements about Soviet behavior?" Or: "Surely
you must know that none of us believes, really, that the So-
viet Union ever will live up to the purposes of the Charter.
We know what they're like: they're gangsters, an outlaw re-
gime-so why should we expect them to behave any differ-
ently than in fact they do?"
This, of course, is the notorious UN "double standard"
in its purest form. There is a direct corollary to this first
point, and that is, where we and our allies do make a stab at
conducting serious, fact-based debate within the UN, by and
large the Soviets deal only with abstract models of Commu-
nist theory-casting themselves as the vanguard among pro-
gressive forces riding the inexorable wave of history. They
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do not speak of reality. They speak of a model that never has
been, is not now, and in my view never will be. But this cre-
ates a rigged arena, a debate that is unequal and unbalanced
by definition. We are expected to and do in fact address the
imperfections and the short-falls in our democratic societies.
The Soviets on the other hand deal with the mythology of
Communist ideology-and that is all that is expected of
them.
A second corollary: We tend to engage in good faith ne-
gotiation in the Security Council. We tend to seek solutions.
We try at least to shape Security Council actions that not only
address genuine issues of conflict, real and potential, but also
may make some contribution to their resolution. We really
do go the last mile. The Soviets, for their part, tend not to
negotiate at all. They generally state a bottom-line position,
stick with it, insist on it, and hope, expect, and anticipate that
the U.S. and the West will continue to seek to reconcile the
differences. I.would simply point out that once you embark
on the process of splitting the difference, which starts typi-
cally from the Soviet bottom line, not ours, there is an un-
ending progression of additional differences that also may be
split, and the advantage thus falls mostly on the Soviet side
and not that of the U.S. and the West. At the U.S. Mission
we called this process "preemptive capitulation" and we be-
gan to turn -the situation around-by, among other things,
making our bottom line clear from the outset and sticking
with it, and by accepting the obvious fact that, sometimes, no
agreement isl better than a bad one. But the process itself, if
one assumes good faith at its core, tends always to play itself
out to the disadvantage of those who bring the good faith to
bear. And that, typically, is not the Soviets.
I turn to a fourth point. In UN councils, the U.S. tends
to argue its case, on its merits, as best it can. And time and
again, because of the fundamental nature of our free and
open society-because one of its great glories is its tolerance
and indeed encouragement of dissent-the Soviet representa-
tives and their clients within the Bloc are able to draw their
arguments largely from U.S. and Western sources: from the
major media, print and electronic, from the scholarly com-
munity, from the Congressional Record. In my own experi-
ence, they often misconstrued, misrepresented, or plain mis-
stated their source material. Thus, they came close to using
U.S. and Western spokesmen to make the Soviet case against
the U.S. case. Typically, it was not so much "us" against
"them" as "us" against "us"-and this even extended to
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such relatively clear-cut issues as the destruction of KAL 007,
where the Soviets drew heavily as the debate proceeded on
mythical "spy" scenarios that began appearing (possibly in
part as a consequence of deliberate Soviet disinformation
campaigns) in the Western media. As I've said, tolerance of
dissent-and the protection of even quite outrageous opin-
ion-are great strengths of liberal democratic societies like
the U.S. But in the UN context it can lead to a rigged and
unequal arena of debate.
There is yet another most curious irony-this is my fifth
major point-about Soviet advantages and U.S. vulnerability
in the UN setting. The Soviets, to their credit, play UN polit-
ics with considerable skill. And these are a style of politics, by
and large, that we Americans invented: these are the politics,
as Ambassador Kirkpatrick often observed, were associated
with multi-party legislatures anywhere in the U.S. or the
democratic West. It's a process that involves vote trading,
log-rolling, the buying and selling of influence. The Soviets
engage in this process skillfully and constantly, and they en-
joy a couple of significant tactical advantages as they go about
their legislative manipulations.
In the first place, they rely heavily on the extremes in
the various regional and ideological groupings or blocs that
wield most of the power within the UN. (As you might ex-
pect, the process I'm describing holds in particular for the
General Assembly-in effect, the annual "legislature" of the
UN. But, increasingly, through the election procedure and
through policy-setting caucuses, bloc dominance also pertains
within the Security Council where it takes only seven votes
among the 15 members to control the Council agenda: any
affirmative action by the Council requires nine votes.) And,
typical of legislatures or indeed of democratic societies any-
where, the extremes tend to drive and control the process;
centrists (or moderates) tend to be less concerned, less fo-
cused, less persistent in maintaining their position: they go
home earlier and doubtless sleep better than the extremists,
but they don't win as many battles.
The Soviets play the extremes skillfully, and particularly
so within what is called the Non-Aligned Movement, the
NAM-a loose grouping of about 95 Third World countries
that largely controls the UN process. Cuba used to hold the
chairmanship of the NAM (which tells you something about
the UN definition of non-alignment). But Cuba or no Cuba
(India currently holds the NAM chairmanship), the Soviets
have master-client relationships with one or more countries
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in all of the regional blocs within the NAM and in the UN
generally. The only exception is Western Europe, and even
here the Soviet-Greek tie is becoming disturbingly cozy. In
our own hemisphere, for example, there are Cuba and Nica-
ragua (and formerly Grenada); in Asia, they have ties with
Vietnam and the Laotian People's Republic (and even with
miniscule Vanuatu); in the Middle East, with Syria, Libya,
and Democratic Yemen; Eastern Europe is the Bloc proper;
and in Africa, there is a variety of Marxist and near-Marxist
regimes with special Soviet relationships- Benin and
Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and others.
So the Soviets are able to manipulate the blocs from within,
as we are not. Almost alone among the UN's one hundred
fifty-nine member countries, the U.S. is indeed non-aligned;
the U.S. belongs to no regional bloc, not even to groupings
of the like-minded (except for the loosest of associations with
the European Community, the EC-10).
The skill with which the Soviets "play" UN politics is, in
my judgment, made all the more successful because their mo-
tivation in the UN setting permit them an almost limitless de-
gree of flexibility, almost a free ride in the seizing of tactical
advantage. As I've observed already, the U.S. by and large is
serious about -the UN. We engage in genuine debate about
genuine issues. We seek genuinely to defuse situations of po-
tential conflict. Soviet purposes, in contrast, by and large are
disruptive. They engage in making mischief, in deliberate
destabilization. Their purpose is to cause trouble, not to head
it off-to create opportunities, in other words, for the exten-
sion of Soviet influence. It is relatively easy for them to seize
on almost any issue that comes along and play it to their
advantage.
The classical case of this in recent years and months, of
course, and in my own experience at the UN, is that of Soviet
involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict and, specifically, the
Soviet role in the Security Council throughout the 1982 war
in Lebanon. There is no question, in my judgment, but that
Soviet manipulation of the Council extended the conflict by
measurable weeks or even months, helped to preserve the
PLO as a military force in the region, shielded the Syrian oc-
cupation of northern and eastern Lebanon from any Council-
mandated countermeasures-and, as an overall result, ren-
dered the reconstitution of an independent, autonomous
Lebanon difficult if not impossible. We are now witnessing
some of the fruits of this Soviet labor: the rebuilding of Syr-
ian strength (and then some), the virtual balkanization of
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Lebanon into warring factions, and the reinfiltration of PLO
armed elements into southern Lebanon. (The most recent es-
timate that I've seen in the press is upwards of two thousand
armed terrorists now on the ground south of the Awali.) I am
not suggesting that the Soviets, alone, brought all this to
pass-simply that they contributed mightily, and that their
skillful manipulation of UN politics and the decision-making
process helped them succeed.
I'll let the balance sheet of Soviet advantages and U.S.
vulnerabilities in the UN context stand there-and turn, fi-
nally, to the obvious question, "So what?" Does it in fact
make very much difference how the UN game is played, who
plays it, who wins and who loses? For that matter, does the
UN itself make much difference any more, one way or the
other? We could brush all this aside as essentially irrelevant,
and get on with the serious business of U.S. foreign policy:
namely, conflict resolution; projecting the goals and purposes
of the United States internationally; protecting the security
of the U.S., and working with our friends and allies to pro-
tect theirs.
I want to give several answers to the question of "so
what". For one thing, we can indeed play the game in the
UN better than we've tended to play it in recent years-and
one great success that I would claim for Ambassador Kirkpat-
rick is that, in the four years she led the U.S. delegation
there, the U.S. became enormously more skillful both in un-
derstanding the nature of the game and in playing it. In fact,
the U.S. now wins some. U.S. influence has rarely been
greater. We do not by any means control the agenda, but it
has become marginally more rational, more productive of
useful outcomes, less dangerous to the vital interests of the
U.S. and the democratic West. This is one possible answer to
the question, "so what", and a not unimportant one. We can
use the UN for our own purposes; increasingly, we are doing
SO.
Beyond this answer, however, there is another possibility,
one that gets us a lot closer to the heart of the successes and
failures of U.S. foreign policy generally. I return to an earlier
point: that what makes the UN arena rigged against us and
debate at the UN inherently unfair to the U.S. and the West
is the tendency-which we let happen and even encourage
with our guilt complex-for this debate to compare and con-
trast the mythology of the Soviet model with the hard, diffi-
cult, ambiguous realities of foreign policy making in this
world, a world of adversarial interests and the threat of con-
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flict. This is not just or even mainly a UN problem of course:
it is a problem inherent in the rivalry of free societies and
nations with unfree, totalitarian, imperial regimes.
In this real world, moreover, the U.S. associates itself
with countries and regimes that are not perfectly free or
democratic, with counties and regimes that, in the best of all
possible worlds, we might not want to associates ourselves
with at all. But we do so in part out of strategic neces-
sity-and, beyond strategic necessity, out of the very real
hope that the evolution of these countries and regimes is in
the direction of greater freedom and more nearly effective
democratic institutions. This is a complex brief to argue and
to uphold. But, .surely, it is a prime mover of our foreign
policy.
A reasonable case can be made for strengthening the
U.S. role in the UN if only to carry this fight to the Soviets,
and to invite the non-aligned to listen and to reflect-to keep
on arguing that, among the superpowers, the Soviets up to
now have had an easier time of it than the U.S., but no more.
As things stand, the Soviets commit open aggression, but
they are not held responsible for it. They engage in brutal
intimidation, but that is taken in stride. Their blatant use of
force to project their influence and to protect their turf is
attributed to a long (and falsified) history of victimization,
thereby justifying it. All this must be challenged. On the af-
firmative side, the case also can be made in the UN forum
that we, the U.S. and the democratic West, intend to stick to
our principles-we intend to continue to try at least to per-
suade the genuinely uncommitted (of which there are many
within the non-aligned bloc) that the course we project for
our friends and allies is one that, in the long run, will come
closer, if not as close as we might like, to fulfilling the objec-
tives of the UN Charter, based as they are on the values and
the deeply held beliefs of the American people and the peo-
ple of the democratic West. That might just constitute an ef-
fective brief within the UN.
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